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Approaching Debt Collector-Judge
Conununications Under the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act
SamanthaA. Danielst

INTRODUCTION

Congress enacted the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(FDCPA or the Act)1 in 1977 "to eliminate abusive debt
collection practices . . . to insure that those debt collectors who

refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not
competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State
action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses." 2
Section 1692e of the Act created a private enforcement
mechanism8 for consumers by prohibiting debt collectors from
using "any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or
means in connection with the collection of any debt."4
Due to the economic downturn,5 consumers are not only
awash with debt'6 but are also defaulting on their debt at the
highest level in recent memory.7 In consequence, the size of the
debt collection industry has increased dramatically.8 Indeed, no
other industry generates as many complaints to the Federal

t BA 2010, Cornell University; JD Candidate 2014, The University of Chicago Law
School.
' 15 USC § 1692.
2
15 USC § 1692(e).
4

See 15 USC
See 15 USC

§ 1692k.
§ 1692e.

s See Terry Carter, Payback: Lawyers on Both Sides of Collection are Feeling Debt's
Sting, 60 ABA Journal 40 (Dec 2010) ("The Federal Reserve pegs 'consumer credit
outstanding' at more than $2.4 trillion.").
r See id.
See Michelle Singletary, Calling the Debt Collectors on Abuse, Wash Post A14
(Oct 29, 2009).
" See id.
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Trade Commission (FTC), 9 and FDCPA litigation is on the rise.10
Unfortunately for defaulting consumers, many debt collectors
have responded to the crisis by wielding more aggressive
collection tactics." Too often, the success of such tactics can
depend on the consumer debtors' gullibility and powerlessnessessentially, their propensity for intimidation. 12
Against this backdrop, the way courts interpret the
FDCPA's scope has become an increasingly salient issue to debt
collectors and consumers. 13 While the FDCPA primarily targets
communications between debt collectors and consumer debtors
in order to protect consumers from abusive collection practices, 14
several
FDCPA
provisions
impose
restrictions
on
communications between debt collectors and nonconsumer third
parties. 15 Section 1692e does not expressly mention third
parties,1 6 but the language of the statute could arguably apply to
some third parties by implication, which creates ambiguity.' 7
Not surprisingly, when a debt collector directs a communication
at a third party, courts have diverged over whether § 1692e
covers the alleged misrepresentation.1 8 Recently circuit courts
have struggled to define the extent to which a debt collector's
representations to a state court judge 9 during the course of debt
collection litigation can violate § 1692e. 20
9 See Carter, 60 ABA Journal 40 (cited in note 5).

10 See Laurie A. Lucas and Alvin C. Harrell, Consumer Standards Under the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act: A Case for Regulatory Expansion, 62 Consumer Fin LQ
Rep 232, 247 (2008).
n See Carter, 60 ABA Journal 40 (cited in note 5). These tactics include excessive
telephone calls, collectors misrepresenting the amount or legal status of a debt, and the
addition of unauthorized fees and interest to accounts. Id.
12 See Dan Schechter, Misleading Collection Letter Sent to Debtor's Counsel May
Violate FDCPA, 2011 Comm Fin News 50 (2011).
'3 See Carter, 60 ABA Journal 40 (cited in note 5).
14 See 15 USC § 1692e.
15 See Bruce N. Menkes, Communications with Persons Other Than the Debtor
Under the FDCPA, 65 Consumer Fin LQ Rep 328 (2011).
1e See 15 USC § 1692e.

See Menkes, 65 Consumer Fin LQ Rep at 328 (cited in note 15).
There is also a current split over whether a debtor's communications to an
attorney are actionable. See id at 328 (discussing three-way circuit split on the issue).
See also Elwin Griffith, The Search for Better Communication Between the Debt Collector
and the Consumer Under the Fair Debt Collection PracticesAct, 61 U Kan L Rev 179,
219-20 (2012) (making plain language argument regarding attorney communications);
Part III.D (comparing debt collector-judge split with debt collector-attorney split).
19 The Comment will use "state court judge" and "judge" interchangeably.
2
See Hemmingsen v Messerli & Kramer, PA, 674 F3d 814, 818 (8th Cir 2012)
1

1s
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Consequently, the circuits are split2l over whether FDCPA
protections cover a debt collector's communications to a judge. 22
On one side of the divide, the Seventh Circuit recently held the
FDCPA and its protections do not extend to a debt collector's
communications with a state court judge. 23 On the other hand,
the Sixth and Eighth Circuits have applied § 1692e to a
collector's representations made to a judge. 24
Whether
§ 1692e applies to a debt collector's
communications to a judge can have a decisive impact on debt
collection suits. 2 5 The issue implicates the scope of a consumer
debtor's ability under the FDCPA to combat misleading
representations in documents filed in court. Debt collectors
increasingly rely on state courts to collect debts, particularly
default judgments.2 6 As a strict liability statute, 2 7 the FDCPA
provides consumers with a powerful tool to deter false,
deceptive, or misleading collector practices, so courts that
exclude a debtor's communications to a judge immunize a broad
swath of behavior. 28

("[T]he circuit courts have struggled to define the extent to which a debt collection
lawyer's representations . .. in court filings during the course of debt collection litigation
can violate §§ 1692d-f.").
21 See id (noting the question is unresolved among the circuits); Sykes v Mel Harris
& Associates, LLC, 2012 WL 3834802, *n 9 (SDNY) (describing split); Menkes, 65
Consumer Fin LQ Rep at 328 (cited in note 15) (noting split of authority).
22 Compare O'Rourke v PalisadesAcquisition, XVI, LLC, 635 F3d 938, 941 (7th Cir
2011) (holding the FDCPA does not apply to a debt collector's communications with a
judge) with Hemmingsen, 674 F3d at 818 (reasoning the FDCPA can apply to a debt
collector's communications with a judge) and Hartman v Great Seneca FinancialCorp,
569 F3d 606, 609 (6th Cir 2009) (applying the FDCPA to a debt collector's
communications with a judge).
23 O'Rourke, 635 F3d at 941.
24 Hartman,569 F3d at 609; Hemmingsen, 674 F3d at 818.
25 See Part
II.
26
See O'Rourke, 635 F3d at 940 ("Debt collectors who work on very thin profit
margins rely on these default judgments ... [because] it is too expensive to actually
litigate [a] case . . . [and] they cannot always establish the debt.").
27 See 15 USC §
1692k.
28 See McCollough v Johnson, Rodenburg & Lauinger, LLC, 637
F3d 939, 948 (9th
Cir 2011). Moreover, the Supreme Court recently let the Seventh Circuit's decision
denying FDCPA coverage to debt collector-judge communications stand by denying
certiorari, so confusion is likely to continue. See O'Rourke v PalisadesAcquisition, XV7,
LLC, 132 S Ct 1141 (2012). Commentators have previously noted that the ambiguity in
the statute should be congressionally resolved, but Congress has not responded. See
Menkes, 65 Consumer Fin LQ Rep at 328 (cited in note 15); Singletary, Calling the Debt
Collectorson Abuse (cited in note 7).
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Part I of this Comment will survey the FDCPA, providing
the relevant background on the Act's purposes and scope. Next,
Part II describes the important role of debt collector-judge
communications in the debt collection process, including the
communication's ability to secure default judgment. Part III will
describe the circuit split, discussing and comparing the Seventh,
Eighth, and Sixth Circuits' approaches, and compare the split
with the similar split over whether the FDCPA applies to debt
collector-attorney communications. Part IV rejects the Seventh
Circuit's approach, arguing that the FDCPA applies to debt
collector-judge communications. Finally, after concluding that
the FDCPA should apply to such communications, Part V will
survey the various standards courts have used to determine
whether a communication is false or misleading and propose
that courts should assess FDCPA communications from the
perspective of a reasonable recipient with an eye towards
materiality.
I. THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT
This Part will provide the FDCPA's relevant background.
First, this Part will survey the purposes and objectives that
animated the 95th Congress to pass the Act. Next, this Part will
describe the Act's scope, with particular attention to § 1692e.
A.

Purposes and Objectives

Members of the enacting Congress indicated that they
passed the FDCPA to remedy a growing national problem. 29
Before 1977, many states had no laws governing consumer debt
collection practices, and the laws that did exist provided
piecemeal protection against national debt collection agencies. 30
Consequently, abusive debt collection practices pervaded the
country, contributing to a "number of personal bankruptcies, to
marital instability, to the loss of jobs, and to invasions of
individual privacy." 3 1

See 15 USC § 1692(a) ("Congressional findings and declaration of purpose.").
so See Consumer Credit Protection Act, S Rep No 95-382, 95th Cong, 2d Sess 382
(1977), reprinted in 1977 USCCAN 1695, 1696 ("The primary reason why debt collection
abuse is so widespread is the lack of meaningful legislation on the State level.").
31
15 USC § 1692(a).
29
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Reacting to the urging of various consumer groups,
Congress adopted the FDCPA on September 20, 1977 to address
the "abundant evidence" of abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt
collection practices used by many debt collectors. 32 Under the
Act's purposes stated in § 1692a, members of the enacting
Congress sought "to eliminate abusive debt collection practices
by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who
refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not
competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State
action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses." 33
Congressmen wanted to strike a balance that would
eliminate abusive practices against the consumer while also not
unduly constraining ethical debt collectors. 34 Consumers in debt,
far from being "deadbeats," often legitimately default on their
loans due to unforeseen circumstances, 3 5 and "[m]eans other
than misrepresentation or other abusive debt collection practices
are available for the effective collection of debts."3 6 Recognizing
this, the statute created a powerful remedy that consumers
would privately enforce, 37 while also preserving debt collectors'
legitimate judicial remedies against the consumer to collect the
debt. 38

32

3

15 USC § 1692a.
15 USC § 1692(e).

3
As one Congressman posed the issue: "[hiow do we [Congress] stop abusive
practices without at the same time impairing the ability of honest, professional debt
collectors to just collect debts?" The Debt Collection Practices Act, Subcommittee on
Consumer Affairs of the Commerce on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 95th
Congress, 2d Sess 21 (1977) (statement of Chalmers Wylie).
3
S Rep No 95-382 at 3 (cited in note 30) (noting only 4 percent of all defaulting
debtors fit the description of "deadbeat" and "the vast majority of consumers who obtain
credit fully intend to repay their debts" such that "[w]hen default occurs, it is nearly
always due to an unforeseen event such as unemployment, overextension, serious illness,
or marital difficulties or divorce").
36 15 USC § 1692(c).

15 USC § 1692k.
15 USC § 1692c (excepting from actionable communications those that "notify the
consumer that the debt collector or creditor may invoke" or "intends to invoke" a
"specified remedy" of a kind "ordinarily invoked by [the] debt collector or creditor");
Hemmingsen v Messerli & Kramer, PA, 674 F3d 814, 818 (8th Cir 2012), citing Heintz v
Jenkins, 514 US 296 (1995) (noting concern for preserving creditors' judicial remedies
compels a cautious balancing of actionable FDCPA claims).
3

3
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Scope of the FDCPA

The Act restricts a range of debt collector conduct. It
prohibits debt collectors from using practices that are abusive,
harassing,39 or unfair 40 and regulates how a debt collector can
communicate when seeking to recover a debt. The Act defines
"debt collector" as: "[A]ny person who uses any instrumentality
of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the
principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who
regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly,
debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another."41
Congress also defined "communication" broadly, as "the
conveying of information regarding a debt directly or indirectly
to any person through any medium." 42 While the statute
primarily focuses on communications between the debt collector
and the consumer, several provisions of the FDCPA also impose
restrictions on communications between debt collectors and
third parties. 43
Section 1692e, the subject of this Comment, simply
prohibits a debt collector from using "any false, deceptive, or
misleading representation or means in connection with the
collection of any debt,"44 without expressly mentioning third
parties recipients.4 5 Section 1692e further includes list of
§ 1692e violationS4 6 but expressly notes that the list is not
intended to "limit[ ] the general application" of the overarching
first sentence. As the section's heading does not expressly
mention which recipients would implicate a debt collector's

9 See 15 USC § 1692d(1)-(6) (listing six violations considered to constitute
harassment or abuse under the Act and noting the list is not exhaustive).
'0 See 15 USC § 1692f(1)-(8) (listing eight types of conduct considered a violation of
this section and noting the list is not exhaustive).
41 15 USC § 1692a. The Supreme Court has held that "debt collector" includes
attorneys litigating on behalf of debt collectors. Heintz, 514 US at 292. See Part I.B.
42 15 USC § 1692a.
4 Some provisions mention third parties expressly. See, for example, 15 USC
§ 1692b (regulating how debt collectors acquire location information from "any person
other than the consumer"); 15 USC §1692c(b) (prohibiting, with certain exceptions, debt
collectors from communicating with persons other than the debtor, the debtor's lawyer,
the creditor or certain others).
44 15 USC

§ 1692e.

5 See 15 USC § 1692e.
46

15 USC

§ 1692e.
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liability, the statute's reach over a communication from a debt
collector to a judge is ambiguous.
II. DEBT COLLECTOR JUDGE COMMUNICATIONS IN THE DEBT
COLLECTION PROCESS
An overview of common debt collection realities
demonstrates that judges are constant and often inescapable
recipients of a debt collector's communications in a debt
collection proceeding. Consequently, applying § 1692e to reach
such communications significantly affects both debt collectors
and consumers. This Part will first survey the debt collection
process and next highlight how the process makes the FDCPA's
scope an important inquiry.
The debt collection process begins when consumers become
seriously delinquent, and their original creditors give up trying
to collect the debt. The creditors may then sell the debt to "bulk
buying" collection agencies as a way to recoup some money on
the accounts, 4 7 and in return, the debt collection agency receives
a fixed percentage of the recovered debt. 48 If an agency cannot
get payment through phone calls and letters, it typically brings
suit to recover the debt. 49 The vast majority of these suits end in
default judgments in which the judge accepts the validity of the
debt collector's complaint and attachments at face value without
requiring proof of the representations' validity.50 A judge may
ask the debt collector to verify the statements in a court
document; however, nothing compels the judge to exercise this
discretion, and judges overwhelmingly do not. 51 For the affected
individual consumer, a default judgment can allow a debt
collector to create a judgment lien on the consumer's real estate,
freeze the consumer's bank account, or garnish the consumer's
wages. 52
The debt collection industry relies on continual default
judgments to remain in business, so debt collectors in particular

See Schechter, 2011 Comm Fin News at 50 (cited in note 12).
See O'Rourke v PalisadesAcquisition, XVI, LLC, 635 F3d 938, 941 (7th Cir 2011).
49 See Carter, 60 ABA Journal at 40 (cited in note 5).
47

48

5 See O'Rourke, 635 F3d at 941; see also Carter, 60 ABA Journal at 40 (cited in
note 5) (citing study in a New York City civil court showing debt collectors got default
judgments in 87 percent of the matters and prevailed more than 94 percent of the time).
r) Carter, 60 ABA Journal at 40 (cited in note 5).
52 O'Rourke, 635 F3d at 941.
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must craft their court communications to obtain favorable
judgments. 53 Because debt collectors purchase repackaged debt,
they often do not have access to documents verifying that a debt
is owed. Consequently, it is difficult for debt collection agencies
to certify key facts in their affidavits, including the debt's owner
or amount. 54 Moreover, as the cost to actually litigate such suits
usually outweighs the amount the consumer owes, debt
collectors will terminate their claim if the consumer appears in
court to challenge the suit.55 The verification problems and the
inability to economically litigate compel debt collectors to fully
establish all the facts with the complaint and attached
exhibits.56
These debt collection realities make § 1692e's reach to the
judge particularly important. Nothing forces a debt collector to
directly communicate to the consumer debtor the evidence in a
complaint before sending notice of the suit.57 In fact, a debt
collector has incentives to ensure a consumer debtor does not
know a suit is underway5 8 by using tactics like failing to serve
the consumer or improperly serving the consumer.5 9 Moreover,
default judgment rewards collectors not only for bringing suit
supported by insufficient evidence but for supporting their
claims with misleading or deceptive evidence.6 0 A debt collector's
affidavit could contain a host of information that a judgetrusting it to be authentic and already overburdened with debt
rule in favor of the debt collector
collection suits 6 1-would
without requiring the collector to show additional proof of the
debt. 62

" See id at 939-40.
'
See id.
55 Id.
56 O'Rourke, 635 F3d at
940.
" This occurred in O'Rourke v Palisades Acquisition, XVI, LLC. See id at 939; see
also Part III.A (surveying O'Rourke's facts).
* See Carter, 60 ABA Journal at 40 (cited in note 5) ('The problem is they [(debt
collectors)] have no incentive to get it right. Their business model is based on defaults.
They only have that incentive after getting the default, when they want to collect. Then
they are fantastic at finding a good address.").
9 See id (citing study showing 71 percent of the alleged debtors were not served or
served improperly).
6
See id.
6
See id.
62 See O'Rourke, 635 F3d at 939-41.
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III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
As shown above, lack of communication (or receipt of
communication) between debt collectors and consumers makes
§ 1692e's
prohibitions
against
a
debt
collector's
misrepresentations to a judge a particularly salient inquiry. Yet
a circuit split existS63 over whether § 1692e extends to a debt
collector's communications with a judge. 64 On one side of the
split, the Seventh Circuit's approach held that the Act does not
apply to communications made to a judge.65 The court created a
bright-line limiting principle, restraining § 1692e's reach only to
those who "stand in the shoes of the consumer."6 6 Conversely,
the Eighth and Sixth Circuits have applied the FDCPA to such
representations. 6 7 The Eighth Circuit has applied § 1692e to
debt collector-judge communications on a case-by-case basis,
while the Sixth Circuit gives blanket FDCPA protection to all
debt collector-judge communications.
First, this Part will survey the debt collector-judge
communication circuit split. Next, this Part will compare the
circuit split with the additional split over whether § 1692e
covers debt collector-attorney communications.
A.

The Seventh Circuit's Approach: O'Rourke v Palisades
Acquisition

In O'Rourke v PalisadesAcquisition,68 the Seventh Circuit
held that the FDCPA does not cover debt collector-judge
communications but only those communications directed to
either the consumer or those that "stand in the shoes" of the
consumer. 69 In O'Rourke, a debt collector filed a collection suit
6
Hemmingsen v Messerli & Kramer, PA, 674 F3d 814, 818 (8th Cir 2012) (noting
the question is unresolved); Sykes v Mel Harris & Associates, LLC, 2012 WL 3834802, *n
9 (SDNY) (same); Bruce N. Menkes, 65 Consumer Fin LQ Rep at 328 (cited in note 15)
(noting split of authority).
6
Compare O'Rourke v PalisadesAcquisition, XVI, LLC, 635 F3d 938, 941 (7th Cir
2011) (holding FDCPA does not apply), with Hartman v Great Seneca Financial Corp,
569 F3d 606, 609 (6th Cir 2009) (applying the FDCPA), and Hemmingsen, 674 F3d at
818 (reasoning FDCPA can apply).
6
See O'Rourke, 635 F3d at 940.
6
Id at 943.
67 See Hemmingsen, 674 F3d at 819; Hartman, 569 F3d at 610.
6
635 F3d 938 (7th Cir 2011).
69 Id at 943. The court noted previous decisions that extended FDCPA liability to
communications made to those who stand in the shoes of the consumer. See, for example,
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and attached a statement to the complaint that looked like a
credit card bill.7 0 The document included a "statement closing
date" six months before the date the complaint was filed and
listed the consumer as the issuing party, even though the
consumer was not the original creditor. 7' However, the debt
collector never sent the statement to the consumer. 72 The court
found that the debt collector
wanted to give the judge the impression that [the
consumer] had received the statement and never
objected. Thus, [any] judge who examines the complaint
and the attached statement trusting it to be authentic
would believe that there is no reason to exercise his
discretion and require additional proof of the debt. 73
Believing such representation to be actionable, the
consumer sued in federal court under § 1692e of the FDCPA,
asserting that the attachment of the statement would mislead a
judge handling his case. 74
Rejecting the consumer's contention, the court created its
own "limiting principle" to curb the FDCPA's reach.7 5 The court
began by conceding that the text of the "broadly written" § 1692
''says nothing of to whom the representation has to be made for
it to be actionable."7 6 However, without some limit to § 1692e, its
text would "be so open-ended as to include, for example, a
misleading letter sent to the wrong address." 7 7 In light of the
Act's "purpose and numerous provisions" that "focus on the
consumer," the court concluded that "the prohibitions are clearly
limited to communications directed to the consumer and do not
apply to state judges."7 8 The court's principle would extend the
Evory v RJM Acquisitions Funding LLC, 505 F3d 769, 773 (7th Cir 2007) (extending to
consumer's attorney); Wright v Financial Service of Norwalk, Inc, 22 F3d 647, 650 (6th
Cir 1994) (extending to consumer's executrix).
70 O'Rourke, 635 F3d at 939.
n1 Id.
72 Id.

Id.
7 O'Rourke, 635 F3d at 939.
71 Id at 943.
7

76 Id at 941-42.

Id at 943.
O'Rourke, 635 F3d at 943. In concluding this, the court asserted "the Act is meant
'to protect consumers against debt collection abuses"' and reasoned "[miany of the
77

78
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FDCPA's protection only "to consumers and those who stand in
the consumer's shoes."7 9 In other words, "the Act is limited to
protecting consumers and those who have a special relationship
with the consumer-such that the Act is still protecting the
statements that would mislead these
consumer-from
consumers."80

Despite the court's emphasis on the consumer, the Seventh
Circuit had previously held in Evory v RJM Acquisitions
Funding LLC 81 that the Act's broad language covers a debt
collector's communications to the consumer's attorney. 82 The
O'Rourke court distinguished Evory on agency grounds,
reasoning that statements from debt collectors to a consumer's
attorneys are actionable because lawyers, unlike judges, stand
in the shoes of the consumer.83
In a concurring opinion, 84 Judge John Tinder argued the
court should not interpret the FDCPA to exclude all debt
collector-judge communications. 85 Judge Tinder noted that the
purpose and language of the FDCPA are quite broad and "[do]
not exclude any class of persons from the Act's protection."86
Although judges might not stand in the shoes of the consumer,
courts are a still a "medium through which debt collection
information is conveyed to consumers" and judges can play "an

specific instances of conduct that violate this Section are protections for consumers." Id
(emphasis in original).
7
Id at 943-44. The court has also stated that its limiting principle requires the
misleading statement at issue to "have the ability to influence a consumer's decision." Id
at 941-42 (emphasis in original).
so Id at 943.
81

505 F3d 769 (7th Cir 2007).

"

Id at 774.

3 As the court elaborated:
Judges do not have a special relationship with consumers. They stand as
impartial decision-makers in the discharge of their office. . . . They are neither
a consumer's advocate nor his adversary; their role is to ensure that the
process is followed. They have no special relationship with the consumer; thus,
the Act's protections do not extend to communications that could mislead them.
O'Rourke, 635 F3d at 941.
s While Judge Tinder did not agree with the majority's broad reasoning, he
concurred in the result because the consumer plaintiff had not brought enough evidence
to show the communication at issue would mislead the unsophisticated consumer. Id at
948 (Tinder concurring).
8
Id (Tinder concurring).
8
Id (quotation marks omitted) (Tinder concurring).
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extremely consequential role in the debt collection process" 8 7 and
thus "are unquestionably 'connect[ed]' to debt collectors'
collection efforts."88
Instead of the majority's limiting approach, Judge Tinder
would resolve the case by applying the FDCPA to the
communication "with reference to the unsophisticated consumer
standard," but suggested that a higher standard should apply to
communications made to judges.8 9
B. The Eighth Circuit's Approach: Hemmingsen v Messerli &
Kramer
In contrast to O'Rourke, the Eighth Circuit has proposed a
pragmatic and cautionary approach to determine viable FDCPA
claims. In Hemmingsen v Messerli & Kramer,9 0 the Eighth
Circuit reasoned that the FDCPA could apply to a debt
collector's representations to a court, noting that "the diverse
situations in which potential FDCPA claims may arise during
the course of litigation. . . counsel against anything other than a

case-by-case approach."9 1
Applying its case-by-case approach to the action in
Hemmingsen, the court concluded the consumer debtor lacked a
meritorious FDCPA claim. 92 Here, the consumer debtor alleged
that the debt collector filed a motion for summary judgment
with an attached affidavit that was false and misleading. 93 The
court began by noting that while representations in court filings
are rarely made directly to the consumer, it is true that "such
representations routinely come to the consumer's attention and
may affect his or her defense of a collection claim." 9 4 In contrast,
the court emphasized that here none of the parties involved (the
consumer, her attorney, or the judge) was actually misled by the
representation, that the consumer's attorney already knew
about the representation, and that neither the consumer nor the
attorney took any action relying on the accuracy of the
8'

8
8

9

O'Rourke, 635 F3d at 949 (Tinder concurring).
Id at 948 n 2, citing 15 USC § 1692e (Tinder concurring).
O'Rourke, 635 F3d at 947 (Tinder concurring).
674 F3d 814 (8th Cir 2012).

'

Id at 819.

9

Id.
Id at 816.

9

Hemmingsen, 674 F3d at 816.

9
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representation. 95 The court, however, did not expressly indicate
an enumerated list of factors courts should consider when
applying the case-by-case approach, and did not state what
factors would be most important to determine the viability of a
FDCPA claim.9 6
Countervailing concerns compelled the Eighth Circuit to
reject the consumer's proposed rule that a court should hold a
debt collector's allegations as false and misleading when the
court rejects such allegations "as not adequately supported in
the collection suit."9 7 Because § 1692c expressly exempts certain
debt collector communications notifying the consumer the debt
collector intends to initiate a court remedy, such as a lawsuit,9 8
an overly harsh FDCPA application could chill such conduct. 99
Such a result would be "contrary to the FDCPA's apparent
objective of preserving creditors' judicial remedies,"1 0 0 and would
implicate the collector's "right of access to the courts," an aspect
"of the First Amendment right to petition the Government for
redress of grievances."' 0 1
Unlike the Seventh Circuit's bright-line rule affording
but not judge
protection to attorney communications
02
communications,1
the Eighth Circuit requires a careful
balancing in each case to determine if the FDCPA claim can
continue.10 3 In this way, the court's case-by-case approach has a
gate-keeping function by denying § 1692e protection to all but
those cases that proceed past the inquiry.104 If an action
survives, the court would then apparently apply the
unsophisticated consumer standard to determine if the
representation is misleading or false.105
9

Id at 816-18.

9 See id.
9 Id at 818, citing Heintz v Jenkins, 514 US 296, 296 (1995).
98 15 USC § 1692c(c).
9 See Heintz, 514 US at 296; Hemmingsen, 674 F3d at 818.
100 Hemmingsen, 674 F3d at 818, citing Heintz, 514 US at 296.
101 Hemmingsen, 674 F3d at 819.
102
O'Rourke, 635 F3d at 941.
103
See Hemmingsen, 674 F3d at 819.
'04

See id.

'o5 The court did not expressly state what standard would apply, but the Eighth
Circuit generally applies the unsophisticated consumer standard to FDCPA claims. See
Strand v Diversified Collection Service, Inc, 380 F3d 316 (8th Cir 2004) (applying
unsophisticated consumer standard). At least one district court in the Eighth Circuit has
done so since the recent Hemmingsen decision. Henggeler v Brumbaugh & Quandahl,
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The Sixth Circuit's Approach: Hartman v Great Seneca
FinancialCorporation

6 the
In Hartman v Great Seneca Financial Corporation,10
Sixth Circuit held that the consumer had raised a genuine issue
of material fact over whether the debt collector's attached
statement to the complaint was misleading. 0 7 In a fact pattern
similar to O'Rourke, 08 the collector filed a complaint with an
attached document resembling a credit card statement.109 The
consumer alleged the collector sought to misrepresent the
document as an actual statement of the consumer's account.110
Unlike the O'Rourke court, the Sixth Circuit applied § 1692e to
the communication without discussion."' To assess whether the
representation was false or misleading, the court then applied
the least sophisticated consumer test.112
Unbound by the Seventh Circuit's limiting principle" 3 or
the Eighth Circuit's more nuanced case-by-case approach," 4 the
Sixth Circuit's approach would apply § 1692e to the broadest
swath of communications." 5 According to this analysis, the
Sixth Circuit would always apply § 1692e to a debt collector's
communications with a judge; the only inquiry would ask

PC, LLO, 2012 WL 762103 (D Neb). See also Part V.A.1 (surveying varying circuit
standards).
106 569 F3d 606 (6th
Cir 2009).
1o7 Id at 612.
108
109

See Part III.A (surveying O'Rourke's facts).
Hartman, 569 F3d at 610.

110 Id.

"' Id at 612. The Sixth Circuit has also reversed another district court decision that
granted summary judgment for the defendant debt collectors where the federal
complaints alleged deceptive statements in the complaints filed in state court and did
not question the application of § 1692e to state court communications. See Grden v
Leikin Ingber & Winters PC, 643 F3d 169, 172 (6th Cir 2011) (reversing a district court's
decision to grant the defendant's motion for summary judgment and finding that a jury
could find that a document filed in a state court debt collection action was misleading).
Additionally, the Sixth Circuit found that the attorneys for a law firm who submitted an
affidavit in a state court debt collection action were not entitled, in a federal suit under
the FDCPA, to absolute immunity as complaining witnesses. Todd v Weltman, Weinberg
& Reis Co, LPA, 434 F3d 432, 439-47 (6th Cir 2006).
112 Hartman, 569 F3d at 613. This Comment will describe the least sophisticated
consumer test in Part V.A.
113 O'Rourke, 635 F3d at 943.
114 Hemmingsen, 674 F3d at
818-19.
us See Hartman, 569 F3d at 613.
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whether the representation was likely to mislead the least
sophisticated consumer. 1 6
D.

Circuit Split Over Debt Collector-Attorney Communications

The circuits have also split over whether the FDCPA covers
a debt collector's communications to a consumer's attorney.117 As
the Seventh Circuit distinguished O'Rourke from Evory on
agency grounds by holding in O'Rourke that only those who
stand in the shoes of the consumer receive FDCPA protection,11 8
it is worth comparing how other courts have treated debt
collector-attorney communications with the Seventh, Eighth,
and Sixth Circuits to see how courts treat attorney recipients.
The Seventh Circuit's agency rationale has driven other
circuits to reach the opposite conclusion, instead using agency as
a reason to deny FDCPA protection for a debt collector's
communications to an attorney.1 1 9 For example, in Guerrero v

RJMAcquisition LLC,12 0 the Ninth Circuit held the FDCPA does
not cover a debtor's communications to an attorney because
Congress viewed attorneys as learned "intermediaries able to
bear the brunt of overreaching debt collection practices." 121
Similarly in Kropelnicki v Siegel,122 reasoning that the FDCPA
does not apply to attorney communication, 12 3 the Second Circuit
emphasized how an attorney "is interposed as an intermediary
between a debt collector and a consumer," such that a court
"assumes the attorney, rather than the FDCPA, will protect the
consumer from a debt collector's fraudulent or harassing
behavior." 124

u6

See id.

Compare Guerrero v RJM Acquisition LLC, 499 F3d 926, 926 (9th Cir 2007)
(holding the FDCPA does not apply to debt collector-attorney communications);
Kropelnicki v Siegel, 290 F3d 118, 127 (2d Cir 2002) (reasoning in dicta the FDCPA does
not apply to debt collector-attorney communications), with Sayyed v Wolpoff &
Abramsom, 485 F3d 226, 232-33 (4th Cir 2007) (holding the FDCPA can apply to
attorney-debt collector communications); Allen ex rel Martin v LaSalle Bank, NA, 629
F3d 364, 366 (3d Cir 2011) (cert denied) (same).
us See O'Rourke, 635 F3d at 943.
119 See Guerrero,499 F3d at 926; Kropelnicki, 290
F3d at 127.
120
499 F3d 926 (9th Cir 2007).
121 Id at 935.
122 290 F3d 118 (2d Cir 2002).
123
Id at 127.
124
Id at 128.
1
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According to this reasoning, both circuits emphasize the
lawyer's role as an intermediary that adequately protects the
consumer from debt collection abuse, and this suggests a debt
collector's communication to an impartial arbiter unable to
protect the consumer could alter the outcome. 125 However, as the
holding of the Ninth Circuit and the reasoning of the Second
Circuit
were
limited
to
attorney-debt
collector
communications,126 it is not clear that extending this analysis
would prohibit judge-debt collector actions.
In contrast, both the Eighth and the Sixth Circuits do not
make any distinctions between the consumer, the attorney, or
the judge. Thus, both courts' analyses would also extend FDCPA
liability to communications a debtor makes to a consumer's
attorney. For example, the Eighth Circuit's sweeping case-bycase approach compels a court to consider all situations that
could arise "in the course of litigation." 1 2 7 The court would
instead focus on the misrepresentation's effect on the litigation
process. 128
This reasoning is consistent with other circuits that have
held the
FDCPA
applies
to attorney-debt
collector
communications.12 9 To come to this conclusion, the Third Circuit

in Allen ex rel Martin v LaSalle Bankl30 relied on a thorough
statutory analysis, emphasizing that the repeated use of the
word "any" in both § 1629e and § 1692f establish that it is the
conduct-not the recipient-that the statute seeks to address.131
The Allen court concluded that because there is nothing in the
FDCPA that "explicitly exempts communications to an
attorney," the FDCPA could apply.132 Similarly, the Fourth
Circuit also applied the FDCPA to attorney-debt collector
communications, holding that communications to the debtor's
counsel are "indirect" communications to debtors and are

In fact, the Ninth Circuit has allowed an FDCPA action to continue when the
communication at issue was in the debt collector's pleadings. See Donohue v Quick
Collect, Inc, 592 F3d 1027, 1030 (9th Cir 2010).
126 See Guerrero,499 F3d at 926; Kropelnicki,
290 F3d at 127.
127 Hemmingsen, 674 F3d at
818.
128 See id at 818-19.
12s

Allen, 629 F3d at 366; Sayyed, 485 F3d at 232.
"0 629 F3d 364, 366 (3d Cir 2011).
'3s Id at 368 ("The focus of § 1692f is on the conduct of the debt collector.").
129

132

Id.
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therefore covered by the FDCPA. 133 Recognizing that the
FDCPA's strict liability has a strong deterrent effect, "[i]f an
otherwise improper communication would escape FDCPA
liability simply because that communication was directed to a
consumer's attorney, it would undermine the deterrent effect of
strict liability."13 4 Overall, both courts emphasized that the
FDCPA does not distinguish among audiences and also refused
to make limiting distinctions.
IV. APPLYING § 1692E TO DEBT COLLECTOR JUDGE
COMMUNICATIONS
The Seventh Circuit created a limiting principle to curb the
FDCPA's scope. This approach, however, is inconsistent with the
FDCPA and Supreme Court precedent. This Part will first
examine the FDCPA's plain language, purposes, and legislative
history. Next, this Part will discuss Supreme Court precedent
interpreting the FDCPA. These considerations, taken in turn, all
direct a court to adopt an expansive interpretation that covers
communications to judges.
A.

The FDCPA and Debt Collector-Judge Communications

The Seventh Circuit's bright-line limiting principle is
inconsistent with the FDCPA. Indeed, a look to the FDCPA's
plain language, purposes, and legislative history compel courts
to apply § 1692e's protection to all debt collector-judge
communications.
Most simply, the plain language of § 1692e covers
misrepresentations made to third parties,135 including judges.
No language in § 1692e excludes a debt collector's
communications with a judge; instead Congress wrote the
section broadly, prohibiting "false, deceptive or misleading
representations or means in connection with the collection of
any debt," with no mention that the judge cannot be the
receiver. 136 Furthermore, the enacting Congress expressly noted
Sayyed, 485 F3d at 232.
Allen, 629 F3d at 368.
13
See Elwin Griffith, The Search for Better Communication Between
the Debt
Collector and the Consumer Under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 61 U Kan L
Rev 179, 219-20 (2012) (making plain language argument regarding attorney
communications).
136 15 USC §
1692e.
'3

'34
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the enumerated list of prohibited actions was nonexhaustive,
demonstrating their intent to cover a broad range of conduct.137
As courts interpreting the FDCPA to cover third party
communications have noted, where the statutory language is
clear, the court will not "rewrite the statute so that it covers only
what [it] think[s] is necessary to achieve what [it] think[s]
Congress really intended." 138
That the judge is the direct audience of the communication
instead of the consumer or attorney should not "transform the
contact between the collector and the attorney into some
independent liaison having nothing to do with the collection of
an
outstanding
debt."13 9
Rather
Congress
defined
communication under the FDCPA broadly as "the conveying of
information regarding a debt directly or indirectly to any person
through any medium." 140 As the O'Rourke concurrence noted,
It is true that judges do not stand in consumers' shoes,
but aren't state courts a medium through which debt
collection information is conveyed to consumers? . . .
Again, recall that [the consumer] received the document
at issue only after it was provided to the court. And it
came to him as a part of the packet of materials
associated with a lawsuit that could result in a judgment
against him. 14 1
Indeed, while representations in court filings are rarely
made directly to the consumer, "such representations routinely
come to the consumer's attention and may affect his or her
defense of a collection claim."14 2 This concern is particularly
salient given that most consumers might never receive either a
document directly from the debt collector (as in O'Rourke)143 or

137 See 15 USC § 1692e.
1ss Lewis v City of Chicago, 130 S Ct 2191, 2200 (2010); Sayyed
v Wolpoff &
Abramson, 485 F3d 226, 234 (4th Cir 2007) ("In the ordinary case, absent any indication
that doing so would frustrate Congress's clear intention or yield patent absurdity, our
obligation is to apply the statute as Congress wrote it."); Mertens v Hewitt Association,
508 US 248, 261 (1993) ("[Viague notions of a statute's 'basic purpose' are inadequate to
overcome the words of its text regarding the specific issue under consideration.").
139 Griffith, 61 U Kan L Rev 179, 218 (cited in note 135).
140 15 USC § 1692a(2).
141 O'Rourke, 635 F3d at 949 (Tinder concurring).
142 Hemmingsen v Messerli & Kramer,PA, 674 F3d 814, 818 (8th
Cir 2012).
143 See O'Rourke, 635 F3d
at 942.
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even the complaint.144 The Seventh Circuit's approach would fail
to cover such documents that are not directed to the consumer or
the consumer's attorney.
As courts have noted, when Congress sought to limit the
application of the FDCPA, it did so expressly.14 5 For example,
§ 1692c designates the consumer as the audience of actionable
communication. 1 4 6 Due to this express text, when analyzing the
scope of that provision a court could rightly emphasize "the
of
and
practical
importance
conceptual,
definitional,
distinguishing 'consumers' from 'attorneys' and other third
collectors'
debt
parties"
because
§ 1692c "regulates
communications with 'consumers,' period." 14 7 In contrast,
§ 1692e "is not so limited."1 4 8 Similarly, the enumerated list in
§ 1692e itself contains both provisions with specific targets and
those without reference to any audience.14 9 Thus, the FDCPA's
text suggests that all debt collector-judge communications are
subject to the FDCPA, except to the limited extent that
Congress has expressly exempted the communications.1 5 0
These textual distinctions imply that members of Congress
knew how to limit the FDCPA's reach and did so when those
legislators deemed it necessary. As the Fourth Circuit
interpreting the express limits within the FDCPA reasoned,
"courts should disfavor interpretations of statutes that render
language superfluous." 5 1 Congress would not have needed to
include recipients in some of § 1692e's list and not others if it
intended to limit the Act's broader provisions. Furthermore,
interpreting these various congressional limits in the FDCPA
demonstrates the text can "implicitly resolve" such absurd
consequences.1 5 2 So the Seventh Circuit's limiting principle,
See Part IV.
14 See 15 USC §§ 1692e, 1692c (containing enumerated exceptions); O'Rourke, 635
F3d at 947 (Tinder concurring); Sayyed, 485 F3d at 234.
146 See 15 USC § 1692c.
141 O'Rourke, 635 F3d at 949 (Tinder concurring).
144

148 Id.

149 15 USC

§ 1692e (containing enumerated provisions mentioning the consumer as

the recipient).
1 o See id.
15

Sayyed, 485 F3d at 231.

For example, the Supreme Court in Heintz used § 1692c(c)'s implicit exceptions to
avoid a result that would not allow the attorney debt collector to file a lawsuit. Heintz v
Jenkins, 514 US 291, 294 (1995) (reconciling allowing litigating attorneys to be a debt
collector with the exceptions in § 1692c(c)). See §§ 1692c(c)(2)-(3) (excepting from
152
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created in part to eliminate absurdities that could result from
having a debt collection letter sent to the wrong address, 153 is a
judicial cure for a problem that Congress has already solved. 154
While the Seventh Circuit's rationale for denying FDCPA
protection to judges focused on the Act's stated purpose of
protecting consumers,155 applying § 1692e to judges better
fulfills all the FDCPA's express purposes and objectives. 15 6 For
example, members of the enacting Congress sought not only to
eliminate abusive debt collection practices but also to ensure
competitively
are
not
collectors
that
ethical debt
disadvantaged.15 7 In this way, the statute's drafters sought to
influence the debt collection market as a whole by focusing on
the debt collector's conduct or "use" of abusive practices. 15 8 Thus,
the Seventh Circuit interpreted the FDCPA's purposes too
narrowly by only focusing on protecting the consumer from
misleading communications. 15 9 By viewing the purposes in the
aggregate, attaching liability to debt collectors' communications
to judges would better fulfill the enacting Congress's goal of
limiting debt collector conduct.
The Act's legislative history also demonstrates that
members of Congress intended to cover a broad range of debt
collector behavior regardless of audience. Both the Senate and
House Reports repeatedly noted that they passed the Act
intending to end such abusive debt practices in general,
regardless of the debt collector's target. 160 For example, the
House committee found that "debt collection abuse by third
party debt collection is a widespread and pervasive problem,"161
liability communication to the consumer that invoke a judicial remedy). Applying the
Court's reasoning to § 1692e, sections within § 1692e could implicitly resolve absurd
results. For example, listed violations that expressly target the consumer limit § 1692e's

reach. See 15 USC

§ 1692e.

O'Rourke, 635 F3d at 943.
'54 The Eighth Circuit's approach in Hemmingsen, apparently only applying FDCPA
protection to cases that pass its "case-by-case" approach, would also create an
unnecessary judicial inquiry. See Hemmingsen, 674 F3d at 818. See also Part III.B.
155 O'Rourke, 635 F3d at 941 ("The Act is meant 'to protect consumers against debt
collection abuses."') (emphasis added).
156 See 15 USC § 1692(a)-(e).
153

...15 USC § 1692(d).
15 See Griffith, 61 U Kan L Rev 179, 219-20 (cited in note 135).
159
160

See O'Rourke, 635 F3d at 941-42.
See Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, HR 195-0137, 95th Cong, 1 Sess 10240

(1977).
161

15 USC

§ 1692(a).
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inflicting substantial "suffering and anguish" not only on the
consumer, but on "anyone" who has been intimidated by abusive
practices. 162
Similarly, the FDCPA's amendment history suggests that
members of Congress intended for courts to apply § 1692e to
judge
communications.
Congressional
committees
have
of
FDCPA's
definition
amending
the
considered
"communications" to expressly exempt legal pleadings.1 63
However, Congress only made a relatively minor change to
§ 1692e(11) by exempting formal pleadings from the
requirement that all communications state that they come from
a debt collector. 164 If pleadings were entirely exempt from the
FDCPA, § 1692e(11)'s express exemption of formal pleadings
would be unnecessary.165 Moreover, by keeping pleadings within
the FDCPA's scope, the congressmen arguably intended to cover
the obvious recipient of those documents: the judge.
B.

Supreme Court Precedent

In addition to the statute and its history, the sparse
Supreme Court precedentl 66 interpreting the FDCPA also lends
support to an expansive reading of the FDCPA that includes
communications sent to a judge. 6 7
In the first case the Court considered, Heintz v Jenkins,168
the Court interpreted the FDCPA's according to its plain
meaning.169 The Court addressed whether the FDCPA's
definition of "debt collector," or "any person . .. who regularly

FairDebt Collection PracticesAct, HR 10137, 95th Cong, 1st Sess, in Cong Rec H
10240 (April 5, 1977).
163 See FairDebt CollectionPracticesAct of 1977, Hearingson HR
3066 before House
Subcommittee on FinancialServices HR 3066, 108th Cong, 2d Sess 3066 (2003).
164 15 USC § 1692e(11) (prohibiting communications that fail to
disclose that they
are from a debt collector, to state that the provision "shall not apply to a formal pleading
made in connection with a legal action"); The Fourth Circuit also used this argument as
support for its reasoning that the FDCPA applies to pleadings. Sayyed, 485 F3d at 231.
'65 See Sayyed, 485 F3d at 231.
'6
The Court has only released two FDCPA related opinions in the last thirty years.
See Heintz v Jenkins, 514 US 291 (1995); Jerman v Carlisle,McNellie, Rini, Kramer &
Ulrich LPA, 130 S Ct 1605, 1611-12 (2010).
167
See Heintz, 514 US at 294; Jerman 130 S Ct at 1611; see also Hemmingsen, 674
F3d at 818 (relying on "the Supreme Court's caution in Heintz" when it noted it would
apply § 1692e to judges).
16
514 US 291 (1995).
169
Id at 294.
162
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collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed
or due or asserted to be owed or due another"7 0 could encompass
a lawyer litigating on behalf of one collecting a debt. Reasoning
that "[iln ordinary English, a lawyer who regularly tries to
obtain payment of consumer debts through legal proceedings is a
lawyer who regularly 'attempts' to 'collect' those consumer
debts," the Court concluded that the definition of "debt collector"
includes lawyers.17 1
Applying the Court's reasoning to § 1692e would likely
afford protection to communications with state court judges. 172
Debt collectors communicate with judges to secure judgments
against the consumer to recover the delinquent debt. 173 So giving
"in connection with any debt" its ordinary English meaning,
such communications would fall under § 1692e. 174 The opinion
implies that courts should not shy away from applying the
statute's ordinary meaning even when it would broaden FDCPA
liability beyond the consumer but also that conduct in the
process of litigation (such as affidavits or complaints made to a
judge) also falls under the Act's protection.
In the more recent case Jerman v Carlisle, McNellie, Rini,
Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 175 the Supreme Court refused to
interpret the Act in a way that would immunize a broad range of
debt collector conduct.176 The Court held that a debt collector
cannot escape FDCPA liability by arguing that he relied on
mistaken legal advice about the Act's requirements.17 7 According
to the Court, such "blanket immunity" for mistakes would be
inconsistent with both the FDCPA's text prohibiting debt
collector misconduct and with Congress's stated purpose of
eliminating abusive debt collection practices.178
Here, as one court has noted, the Supreme Court's decision
not only "reaffirmed the FDCPA's broadly worded prohibitions
170

15 USC

§ 1692a(6).

Heintz, 514 US at 294.
In fact-in contrast to O'Rourke's blunt limiting principle-the Eighth Circuit
believed the Supreme Court's "caution" here compelled a more nuanced approach to
assessing court communications. Hemmingsen, 674 F3d at 818.
173 See Part
II.
171
172

174

15 USC § 1692e.

17

130 S Ct 1605 (2010).
Id at 1611.

176
177

See id.

17s

Id; 15 USC

§ 1692a.
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on debt collector misconduct"179 but also implicitly favored an
interpretation that would not immunize a wide range of
misconduct. 18 0 Judges are a constant, inescapable feature of a
debt collection proceeding; while most suits end in default
judgment, the overwhelming majority of consumers never hire a
lawyer to deal with debt collection suits.181 Consequently,
immunizing debt collectors from communications made directly
to a judge would arguably cover a greater swath of behavior
than would communications made to an attorney. 182 And yet, the
Seventh Circuit's rule would do just that by allowing debt
collectors to push the boundaries of abusive debt collection
practices merely because they targeted their communications to
judges.
V. STANDARD FOR ASSESSING ACTIONABLE DEBT COLLECTORJUDGE COMMUNICATIONS

If a court decides to read the FDCPA to cover
communications to a state court judge, the question of what
standard to apply to those communications remains. First, this
Part will survey courts' current standards for actionable FDCPA
communications directed at consumers and judges. Next, this
Part will propose that courts should assess FDCPA
communications from the perspective of a reasonable recipient
with an eye towards materiality. Finally, this Part will explain
why this standard, which departs from the approaches used by
the Seventh, Eighth, and Sixth Circuits, is preferable.
A.

Current Standards for Assessing False or Misleading
Communications

In addition to the conflict over § 1692e's scope, courts have
disagreed over the appropriate standard to assess whether a

19
Polinsky v Community Health PartnersRegional Health Systems, 858 F Supp 2d
891, 898 (ND Ohio 2012).
18 Jerman, 130 S Ct at 1611. See Polinsky, 858 F Supp 2d at 897-98 (using this
reasoning to apply FDCPA to attorney communications).
181 See Schechter, 2011 Comm Fin News at 50 (cited in note 12) ("I do not think that
this fact pattern (a misleading letter sent to a debtor's lawyer) arises frequently enough
to justify certiorari, since so few consumers ever retain counsel to defend these small
debt collection matters.").
182 See Jerman, 130 S Ct at 1611.
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communication is false or misleading.183 While the Act's text
suggests the FDCPA applies to a broad range of
communications, it is utterly silent about how courts should
consider the deception or falsity of a communication.
Consequently, all standards courts have applied to § 1692eincluding the dominant least sophisticated consumer standardare entirely judge-made, and each standard purports to respond
to the Act's objectives. 184 As neither the FTC nor the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) 185 has taken any regulatory
action that would inform what standard courts should apply in
the thirty years since Congress enacted the FDCPA, the
question of what standard to use will likely remain one for the
courts to decide. 186
1.

Standards for debt collector-consumer communications.

There are two competing standards courts use to assess
false or misleading communications between the debt collector
and the consumer. Most courts, including the Sixth Circuit,
apply the "least sophisticated consumer standard,"187 which asks
whether the representation would have misled the least
'ss

See Part V.A. 1.

184 See Jeter v Credit Bureau, Inc, 760 F2d 1168, 1175 (11th Cir 1985) (choosing
least sophisticated consumer over reasonable consumer standard by inferring Congress's
intent from expanding consumer remedies). Scholars have noted that early courts
establishing the least sophisticated consumer test have done so on questionable grounds.
See Lucas and Harrell, 62 Consumer Fin LQ Rep at 247 (cited in note 10) (noting
scholars have criticized the Jeter court's basis for adopting the least sophisticated
consumer standard as not supported in the FDCPA's text or purposes).
15
Congress transferred the authority to proscribe rules under the FDCPA from the
FTC to the CFPB. 15 USC § 16921(d)) (amending the FDCPA to read "the [CFPB] may
prescribe rules with respect to the collection of debts by debt collectors, as defined in this
title").
186
For an argument advocating a departure from the litigation model, see Lucas and
Harrell, 62 Consumer Fin LQ Rep at 247 (cited in note 10) (arguing the differences
between the least sophisticated consumer standard and the unsophisticated consumer
standard compel regulatory action).
187
See, for example, Brown v Card Service Center, 464 F3d 450, 453 (3d Cir 2006)
(applying least sophisticated consumer standard); US v National Financial Service, 98
F3d 131, 136 (4th Cir 1996) (same); Harvey v Great Seneca FinancialCorp, 453 F3d 324,
329 (6th Cir 2006) (same); Terran v Kaplan, 109 F3d 1428, 1432 (9th Cir 1997) (same);
Russell v Equifax, ARS, 74 F3d 30, 34 (2d Cir 1996) (same); Jeter, 760 F2d at 1175
(same). The First and Tenth Circuits have not specifically ruled on the applicable
standard, although precedent from an unpublished opinion from the Tenth Circuit and
opinions from the district courts in both circuits appear to indicate the use of the least
sophisticated standard. See Ferree v Marianos, 1997 US App LEXIS 30361, *7 (10th Cir);
Pettway v Hubbard, 2005 US Dist LEXIS 21341, *5 (D Mass).
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sophisticated consumer to protect both "the gullible as well as
the shrewd" consumer. 188 On the other hand, the Seventh and
Eighth Circuits apply an "unsophisticated consumer" test,
assessing "whether a person of modest education and limited
commercial savvy would be likely to be deceived." 8 9
Additionally, the Seventh Circuit has suggested that courts
should consider consumer sophistication on a sliding scale based
on the consumer population that received the debt collection
communication.190 Using the sliding scale, courts would adjust
the standard downward for communications targeted to
"particularly vulnerable" consumer groups. 191
While both standards cover consumers of similarly low
sophistications,192 there are some important differences between
the two. First, the Seventh and Eighth Circuits' unsophisticated
consumer standard is somewhat higher. For example, while
courts require the least sophisticated consumer to have a basic
knowledge of the world, courts applying the unsophisticated
consumer standard assume that the consumer is reasonably
intelligent and has a basic understanding of the world of finance
(such as how interest works and how to make logical deductions
and inferences).193 Furthermore, under the least sophisticated
consumer standard, consumer confusion is a question of law for
the judge. 194 In contrast, confusion in an unsophisticated
consumer paradigm is a question of mixed fact and law,195 and
188
Clomon v Jackson, 988 F2d 1314, 1320 (2d Cir 1993) (elaborating the test both
ensures the protection of all consumers, even the naive and the trusting, against
deceptive debt collection practices, and .. . protects debt collectors against liability for
bizarre or idiosyncratic interpretations of collection notices").
189
See Evory v RJM Acquisitions Funding LLC, 505 F3d 769, 774 (7th Cir 2007);
Durkin v Equifax Check Service, 406 F3d 410 (7th Cir 2005); Strand v Diversified
Collection Service, Inc, 380 F3d 316, 317 (8th Cir 2004).

190

Evory, 505 F3d at 774.

The court gave the example of a debt collector communication directed at
consumers the collector "knows have a poor command of English." Id.
192 Some courts have reasoned there is not much "practical difference" between the
two standards. Avila v Rubin, 84 F3d 222, 227 (7th Cir 1996). This has led the Fifth
Circuit to refuse to choose between the two standards. Peter v GC Services LP, 310 F3d
344, 349 (5th Cir 2002) ("Because the difference between the standards is de minimis at
most, we again opt not to choose between the standards."). But see Lucas and Harrell, 62
Consumer Fin LQ Rep at 236 (cited in note 10) (exploring "fundamental" differences
between the two standards).
193
Pettit v Retrieval Masters Creditor Bureau, Inc, 211 F3d 1057, 1060 (7th Cir
2000) (listing attributes of the unsophisticated consumer).
194 Peter, 310 F3d at 349.
195 The Seventh Circuit has noted that although issues of deception are questions of
'91
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some courts have required the consumer to demonstrate actual
consumer confusion through survey evidence.19 6
As a "corollary" to the least or unsophisticated consumer
standard,197 several but not all circuits additionally require that
be materially false or
communication
an actionable
misleading. 9 8 Generally, a representation is material if it might
influence a person's decision on a matter.199 In this way, the
court combines the materiality question with the question of
what would mislead the least or unsophisticated consumer, and
false communications need be material, or more than merely
technical. 200
2.

Standards for debt collector-judge communications.

While the circuits' standards for communications directed at
consumers are similar, there is no consensus over the
appropriate standard for a judge. No court has yet expressly
applied a different standard to communications made to judges;
a few past cases have only suggested another standard might be
desirable without elaborating on how a court would apply such a
standard. 201 The circuits addressing judge communications have
applied varying standards.
fact, the court can still reject a FDCPA claim at the pleadings stage if, for example, the
communication at issue contained "nothing deceptive-seeming," contained "clear
statutory language," was immaterial, clarified elsewhere, or (if claimed to be false) was
obviously true. Evory, 505 F3d at 776-77.
196 Peters v General Service Bureau, Inc, 277 F3d 1051, 1056 (8th Cir 2001).
Although the Eighth Circuit uses the unsophisticated consumer standard, the court has
not yet required consumers show actual confusion. Peters, 277 F3d at 1056 (discussing
the Seventh Circuit's procedural requirement of actual confusion but noting no need to
resolve the issue in the present case).
197 Donohue v Quick Collect, Inc, 592 F3d 1027, 1033 (9th Cir 2010).
199 See, for example, id; Miller v Javitch, Block & Rathbone, 561 F3d 588, 596 (6th
Cir 2009); Hahn v Triumph PartnershipsLLC, 557 F3d 755, 757-58 (7th Cir 2009).
199 See Black's Law Dictionary 998 (West 8th ed 2004) (defining material as
"[hiaving some logical connection with the consequential facts [or] [o]f such a nature that
knowledge of the item would affect a person's decision-making; significant; essential");
Hahn, 557 F3d at 758 (reasoning that a false statement must be material to come under
the § 1692e umbrella because an immaterial falsehood has no impact on the statutory
objective to help consumers make intelligent decisions).
2
Hahn, 557 F3d at 757-58.
201 For example, the O'Rourke concurrence briefly hinted that a "competent judge"
standard could be an appropriate measure for communications to judges but did not
explain what the standard would involve or how to apply it. O'Rourke, 635 F3d at 947
(Tinder concurring). Similarly, one district court has merely noted the rationale for a
"reasonable judge" standard is "not without force" but did not explain the compelling
rationale. Penn v Cumberland, 883 F Supp 2d 5813, 590 (ED Va) (dismissing case
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Both the Sixth and the Eighth Circuits would apparently
apply their respective traditional consumer standards to a debt
collector's communications to a judge. 202 In Hartman, the Sixth
Circuit did not explore possible alternative standards for such
communications but merely applied the traditional approach
without elaboration. 203 As for the Eighth Circuit's approach,
assuming the debt collector's communication to a judge passes
the court's threshold case-by-case approach, 204 it appears the
court would apply the circuit's traditional unsophisticated
consumer test to the communication. 2 0 5 While the court did not
expressly state what standard should apply, at least one lower
court following the Eighth Circuit's recent decision in
Hemmingsen has applied the unsophisticated consumer
standard. 20 6
The Seventh Circuit, while eschewing FDCPA protection for
debt collector-judge communications in O'Rourke, is the only
circuit court to depart from the traditional consumer standard
when dealing with a communication not directed at the
consumer. In Evory, the court created a "competent attorney"
standard 207 for a debt collector's communications to the
consumer's attorney, which would ask whether the debt
collector's representation would be likely to deceive a competent,
nonspecialist lawyer. 208 Given this disparate treatment for a
nonconsumer third party and the O'Rourke concurrence's brief
suggestion that a "competent judge" standard might be
appropriate for judges, 209 it is worth exploring the standard's
rationale and how courts have applied it.

because plaintiff failed to demonstrate falsity under any standard, including the lower
least sophisticated consumer test).
202 Hartman,569 F3d at 608; Hemmingsen, 674 F3d at 818.
203 Hartman,569 F3d at 613. See also Part III.C.
204

Hemmingsen, 674 F3d at 818. See also Part 1II.B.

202 As noted before, the unsophisticated consumer test is the accepted standard in

the Eighth Circuit. Peters, 277 F3d at 1055. See Part V.A.1.
206 Henggeler v Brumbaugh & Quandahl, PC, LLO, 2012 WL 762103, *4 (D Neb)
(applying unsophisticated consumer test without question).
20 Evory, 505 F3d at 774. A district court in the Third Circuit found the Seventh
Circuit's reasoning persuasive and also adopted the competent attorney standard. On
appeal, the Third Circuit did not expressly disagree with the district court's adoption,
but the court held the issue of what standard to apply was not dispositive in the case.
Allen ex rel Martin a LaSalle Bank, NA, 629 F3d 364, 366 (3d Cir 2011).
208 Evory, 505 F3d at 774.

209 O'Rourke, 635 F3d at 947 (Tinder concurring).
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When creating the new standard, the Evory court's
rationale highlighted the different levels of competence between
a consumer and an attorney. 210 The court reasoned that just as
"it is inappropriate to fix a physician's standard of care at the
level of that of a medical orderly," the unsophisticated consumer
standard is inappropriate because "a lawyer is less likely to be
deceived, intimidated, harassed, and so forth" than a
consumer. 21 1 For the court, applying a higher standard would
not impede a consumer's right to competent representation
because most lawyers who represent consumers in debt
collection cases are either knowledgeable about the law and
practices of debt collection or can inform themselves "sufficiently
to be able to represent their consumer clients." 2 12 Furthermore,
such a standard would not require the debt collector to know or
rely on the attorney's level of expertise. 213 However, if the
communication were a false representation (as opposed to a
deceptive
or
misleading
representation) 2 14
the
same
"unsophisticated consumer" standard would apply because it is
just as difficult for a lawyer to see through a false statement as
a consumer. 2 15
While the Seventh Circuit did not apply or explain how to
apply the competent attorney standard, lower court decisions
since Evory provide some idea about what courts would consider
deceptive to the competent attorney. 216 Courts have reasoned,
210
211
212

See Evory, 505 F3d at 774-75.
Id at 774.
Id.

Id at 775.
Evory, 505 F3d at 775 ('Misleading' is similar to 'deceptive,' except that it can be
innocent; one intends to deceive, but one can mislead through inadvertence. A
sophisticated person is less likely to be either deceived or misled than an unsophisticated
one. That is less true if a statement is false.").
215 The court reasoned:
213

214

A false claim of fact in a dunning letter may be as difficult for a lawyer to see
through as a consumer. Suppose the letter misrepresents the unpaid balance of
the consumer's debt. The lawyer might be unable to discover the falsity of the
representation without an investigation that he might be unable, depending on
his client's resources, to undertake. Such a misrepresentation would be
actionable whether made to the consumer directly, or indirectly through his
lawyer.
Evory, 505 F3d at 775.
216 Many lower courts dealing with communications to an attorney did
not need to
apply the heightened standard because the representation was false. See, for example,
Hagy v Demers & Adams, LLC, 2011 WL 5325486, *9 (SD Ohio) ("[T]his Court need not
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for example, that a competent attorney would not be fooled by
representations that the lawyer could verify by a cursory look at
the FDCPA's text,2 17 that are offers of settlement, 218 or that were
attempts by a debt collector to "misrepresent herself as if she
were a friend" while "fail[ing] to provide a meaningful
identification." 219 Regarding a debt collector's threat of illegal
action, however, one lower court reasoned:
Parties often knowingly make threats of illegal action,
hoping that the threat will intimidate the opposing party,
who may not take comfort from the prospect of years of
expensive and uncertain litigation to vindicate her rights.
Such threats can have real effects. The FDCPA . ..

[is]

aimed directly at such tactics in the context of collecting
consumer debts, where power and resources are often, let
us say, asymmetrical. 2 20
Because the competent attorney cannot always ignore such
threats, communications threatening action the lawyer knew to
be illegal could still mislead an attorney into thinking the
collector would do so regardless of the action's illegality. 221
B.

Proposed Standard: a Reasonable Recipient with an Eye
Towards Materiality

Current standards are insufficient to take into account both
the FDCPA's text and competing objectives to protect consumers
while not disadvantaging ethical debt collectors. Because the

reach the issue of whether the least sophisticated consumer standard applies or whether
the competent lawyer standard applies because it is plausible that the [debt collector
defendant] made a false statement, which would be a violation of either standard.");
Longo v Law Offices of Gerald E. Moore & Associates, PC, 2008 WL 4425444, *5 (ND Ill).
217
See Longo, 2008 WL 4425444, *6.
218
Villegas v Weinstein & Riley, PS, 723 F Supp 2d 755, 760-61 (1VID Pa 2010). See
Evory, 505 F3d at 776 ("We are exceedingly doubtful that any lawyer involved in
representing debtors would be deceived by the settlement offers made by debt collectors,
and doubt therefore that any cases based on such offers could survive summary
judgment or even a motion to dismiss were the offer directed to the consumer's lawyer
rather than to the consumer.").
219 Marshall v Portfolio Recovery Associates, Inc, 646 F Supp 2d 770, 775-76 (ED Pa
2009).
220 Captain v ARS National Services, Inc, 636 F Supp 2d 791, 796 (SD Ind 2009).
221 Id. See Evory, 505 F3d at 777-78 (noting in dicta that "a threat
to impose a
penalty that the threatener knows is improper because unlawful is a good candidate for
a violation of sections 1692d and e").
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statute is silent about how courts should assess false or
misleading communications, courts must choose a standard that
comports with the FDCPA's text and fulfills the Act's purposes
and objectives. A more appropriate approach would apply
§ 1692e to all debt collector-judge communicationS 222 and then
ask whether the representation at issue is material to the
recipient, here, the reasonable judge. 223 In essence, a court
would ask whether the representation would be likely to induce
a judge to enter a judgment based on a false, misleading, or
deceptive communication. 2 2 4
First, this Part will compare the proposed approach to the
Seventh and Eighth Circuits' rule, and argue the proposed
standard improves both approaches by maintaining both courts'
reasoning while also harmonizing both approaches with the
FDCPA. Next, this Comment will advocate for a departure from
the Sixth Circuit's least sophisticated consumer approach,
arguing the proposed standard is more consistent with the
FDCPA's purposes and objectives, sufficiently preserves debt
collector's judicial remedies, and would avoid potential pitfalls
when applying the least sophisticated consumer approach to
judges.
1.

Comparing the proposed standard with the Seventh
and Eighth Circuits' approaches.

Both the Seventh and the Eighth Circuits have adopted
approaches that depart from the typical least or unsophisticated
consumer when applied to nonconsumer communications. The
Seventh Circuit exempts debt collector-judge communications
from protection and uses the competent attorney standard for
See Part IV.
This Part will refer to this solution as the "proposed standard" or "proposed
approach."
224 As one court explained:
222

223

In general, a complaint and attached affidavit act as both a message to the
court and a message to the debtor. While the creditor seeks different action
from either audience (payment from the debtor as opposed to judgment from
the court), the general assertions are the same: that the debt is valid, that
there is a total amount, that it is delinquent, that it is subject to interest, and
that it is now due and owing. Therefore, a statement or claim based on an
affidavit would be material if it makes one of those listed assertions more or
less likely than if that fact were not considered.
Midland FundingLLC v Brent, 644 F Supp 2d 961, 969-70 (ND Ohio 2009).
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debt collector-attorney communications. The Eighth Circuit
uses a case-by-case approach to assess whether § 1692e applies,
and then applies the unsophisticated consumer standard. Like
the proposed standard, this Part will argue that materiality
animates both approaches. However, as the statue demands
FDCPA protection for all communications regardless of
audience, 225 neither approach is a satisfactory solution. The
proposed solution would maintain the apparent materiality
rationale behind both approaches while also staying true to the
FDCPA's text.
First, although the Seventh Circuit did not frame its
competent attorney standard in terms of materiality, one could
question whether the competent attorney standard is really a
rough proxy for what representations are likely to be material to
the reasonable recipient, the attorney. Following this reasoning,
the false/deceptive dichotomy 2 2 6 is really an inquiry into what
would influence an attorney; in other words, a false statement is
much more likely to alter the lawyer's behavior to the
consumer's detriment. On the other hand, deceptive practices
that could intimidate or persuade a vulnerable consumer 227
would not influence a lawyer, one who is obligated to assess or
acquire the relevant knowledge to zealously advocate the
consumer's case. 228 Further, materiality arguably animated the
court when it held that a deceptive statement violated the
standard even though the representation was illegal because the
statement could still affect the attorney's decision to vindicate
the consumer's right. 229
As the Seventh Circuit's approach now stands, it is
inconsistent with the FDCPA's text. O'Rourke attempted to
distinguish Evory on agency grounds. 230 This distinction,
however, is inconsistent with the FDCPA's text because the
statute does not distinguish among communications to different
audiences. Moreover, the court's agency rationale provides an
unsatisfying divider because it just as easily led circuits in the
See Part IV.
See Evory, 505 F3d at 775.
227
The feigned friendliness of the collector in Marshall comes to mind. See Marshall,
F Supp 2d at 775-76.
228
See Longo, 2008 WL 4425444, *6 (implying nonspecialist lawyers are already
expected to research the FDCPA to see if a representation complies with the law).
229
See Captain,636 F Supp 2d at 796-97.
220 O'Rourke, 635 F3d
at 941.
225
226
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opposite direction, using the same reasoning to deny attorneys
protections under the FDCPA. 23 1 In contrast, the proposed
approach would maintain the materiality logic behind the
competent attorney standard, and it would expand the
standard's reach to judges in a way that is both consistent with
the statute and would not rely on agency. 232
Similarly, a cursory examination of the factors the Eighth
Circuit examined in its gate-keeping case-by-case approach in
Hemmingsen suggests that the court's key concern is materiality
to the reasonable recipient. 233 For example, the court considered
whether any party took any action "in reliance" upon the
accuracy of the communication. 2 34 Moreover, the Eighth Circuit
also examined whether the lower court was actually misled or
influenced by the debt collector's communication. 235 These
factors the court highlighted imply that, regardless of audience,
the court is really asking if the alleged communication unduly
influenced the recipient's course of action.
Yet while the ends are similar to those achieved by a court
applying § 1692e to judge communications coupled with a
materiality inquiry, the Eighth Circuit's means are problematic.
First, like the Seventh Circuit's approach, the Eighth Circuit's
analysis abrogates the FDCPA's plain text by limiting the
FDCPA's scope. Second, instead of providing clear guidelines for
the threshold inquiry of whether § 1692e applies, the Eighth
Circuit's approach obfuscates the issue by creating an
amorphous "case-by-case" inquiry without giving lower courts a
roadmap. A clearer standard that looks towards materiality
would achieve the court's balancing concerns, and also inject
consistency into the court's FDCPA application.
2.

Departing from the Sixth Circuit's approach.

The proposed approach, and arguably the Seventh and
Eighth Circuits' approaches, all stress materiality to the

See Part III.D.
This was the concern of the majority in O'Rourke. O'Rourke, 635 F3d at 943 *n 3
(reasoning extending the FDCPA to judges would require the court "to craft a test for
whether a communication would confuse or mislead the sophisticated judge, and so on
with each group of persons involved in the debt-collection process").
2
See Hemmingsen, 674 F3d at 819.
23
See id.
2
See id.
231
232
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reasonable recipient. However, one could argue that courts
should adopt the Sixth Circuit's approach and simply assess
debt collector-judge communications through the eyes of the
least or unsophisticated consumer. 236 The proposed standard,
the argument goes, could unduly heighten a court's inquiry and
limit the FDCPA's application, contravening Congress's purpose
of eliminating abusive debt practices in the abstract regardless
of actual harm. However, this Comment argues that the
proposed standard will better serve the FDCPA's purposes,
assure that courts adequately preserve creditors' access to the
courts, and avoid potential problems applying the least
sophisticated consumer approach to a judge.
There is reason to believe that the proposed standard, one
more tailored to the reasonable judge with an eye towards
materiality, would better fulfill the Act's competing purposes. 237
As one Congressman posed the question, "[h]ow do we stop
abusive practices without at the same time impairing the ability
of honest, professional debt collectors to just collect debts?" 2 38
Indeed, members of Congress sought to balance the need to
eliminate abusive practices without putting ethical debt
collectors at a competitive disadvantage, noting both objectives
in the FDCPA's statement of purpose. 239 The FDCPA drafters
did seek to eliminate abusive practices, but did not intend to
eliminate them at all costs. 2 40
This balancing-eliminating abusive practices and not
disadvantaging ethical debt collectors-suggests that Congress
did not intend for courts to apply the FDCPA in a way that
unconditionally covers conduct where the risk of actual abuse is
slight. In other words, because no actual abuse is likely to occur,
Hartman, 569 F3d at 613.
See 15 USC § 1692(a)-(e).
238
The Debt Collection Practices Act, Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs of the
Commerce on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 95th Congress, 2d Sess 21 (1977)
(statement of Representative Chalmers Wylie).
239 See 15 USC § 1692(a).
240 Stepping back from the FDCPA, consumers on the whole are not helped if the
uncertainty of a loose, low standard scares creditors who rely on debt suits, unduly
chilling their willingness to loan money. One commentator has noted creditors are
increasingly concerned "that the United States is abandoning its traditional legal norms
with regard to the enforcement of consumer credit contracts," which could "exacerbate
the current national economic problems by increasing the flight of capital from U.S.
consumer credit markets." Bruce N. Menkes, Recent FDCPA Decisions Impose New
Requirements on State Court Collection Litigation, 62 Consumer Fin LQ Rep 248, 255
(2008).
236

237
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such an application could unduly harm ethical debt collectors
without comparably reducing abuse. A practice cannot be
"abusive" in a vacuum; abuse implies there is some victim to the
abuse. So an artificially low standard for debt collector-judge
communications opens the door for meritless claims in which no
actual abuse is threatened but still allows the recipient to seize
on some technical or perfunctory violation that would confuse
the least sophisticated consumer. For example, a debt collector
could reasonably assume the judge knows about basic finance,
such as how to calculate interest. Indeed, such knowledge is
often essential. 241 Yet such a communication might still run
afoul of the least sophisticated consumer standard although
neither the consumer nor the judge is harmed. As one court
noted,
Ironically, it appears that it is often the extremely
sophisticated consumer who takes advantage of the civil
liability scheme defined by [the FDCPA], not the
individual who has been threatened or misled. The
cottage industry that has emerged does not bring suits to
remedy the "widespread and serious national problem" of
abuse that the Senate observed in adopting the
legislation..

.

. Rather, the inescapable inference is that

the judicially developed standards have enabled a class of
professional plaintiffs . . . .242
Consequently, a scheme too deferential to the least
sophisticated consumer could greatly disadvantage ethical debt
collectors while consistently failing to eliminate any abuse. 24 3
See Midland, 644 F Supp 2d at 969-70 (reasoning a court document acts as
a
message to the judge, asserting "that the debt is valid, that there is a total amount, that
it is delinquent, that it is subject to interest, and that it is now due and owing").
242 Miller, 561 F3d at 596, quoting Jacobson v Healthcare
Financial Services, Inc,
434 F Supp 2d 133, 138 (EDNY 2006).
243 Courts using the unsophisticated consumer standard's heightened
burdens of
proof would not satisfactorily curb suits based on harmless debt collector conduct. It is
true the standard's higher procedural requirements, including the court's emphasis on
survey data, could significantly decrease the volume of cases grounded on highly
technical violations because the requirements raise the evidentiary bar significantly for
the plaintiff. However, Congress intended consumers to use the FDCPA as a private
enforcement mechanism. See 15 USC § 1692k. Arguably requiring consumers to procure
cumbersome and expensive data would unduly restrict the average consumer's access to
the court system. In contrast, from the perspective of the reasonable judge, as federal
courts are "well-suited to determine whether statements submitted to judges in
collection cases are likely to mislead or deceive them," a consumer could cheaply bring a
241
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A reasonable judge standard also addresses Congress's
concern with preserving debt collectors' legitimate access to the
courts. Court documents are frequently a debt collector's sole
resource to collect consumer debt. 24 4 Understanding this,
Congress expressly intended to preserve creditors' legitimate
judicial remedies in § 1692c, such as filing a lawsuit. 2 4 5 In
addition, courts have consistently recognized that the right of
access to the courts is an aspect of the First Amendment right to
petition the Government for redress of grievances. 246 As "going
to a judicial body for redress of alleged wrongs . . . stands apart
from other forms of action directed at the alleged wrongdoer," 247
the need to preserve this right compels courts to apply statutes
in a way that is sensitive to the right to access the courts. 2 4 8 One
could imagine without a standard tailored to the reasonable
judge courts applying a low threshold for FDCPA liability for
court communications might chill a debt collector's willingness
to petition the court, harming the creditor's judicial remedies. 249
Finally, viewing judge communications from the eyes the
least sophisticated consumer could expose courts to application
pitfalls. It is possible a case could arise where a representation
that would be immaterial to the least sophisticated consumer
could materially influence a judge's default judgment decision.

For example, in Miller v Javitch, Block & Rathbone,250 the court
concluded that the consumer plaintiff had failed to show that a
communication regarding "holders in due course," a legal
definition, would mislead the least sophisticated consumer
because "no reason exists to think that the least sophisticated
consumer gives any thought to holders in due course-by

FDCPA claim. O'Rourke, 635 F3d at 949 (Tinder concurring).
244
See Part II.
245 15 USC § 1692c (excepting from actionable communications those
that "notify the
consumer that the debt collector or creditor may invoke" or "intends to invoke" a
"specified remedy" of a kind "ordinarily invoked by [the] debt collector or creditor");
Hemmingsen, 674 F3d at 818, citing Heintz v Jenkins, 514 US 296 (1995) (noting concern
for preserving creditors' judicial remedies compels a cautious balancing of actionable
FDCPA claims).
246
Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc v NLRB, 461 US 731, 741 (1983); Hemmingsen,
674 F3d at 819; California Motor TransportationCompany v Trucking Unlimited, 404
US 508, 512 (1972).
247
Bill Johnson'sRestaurants,461 US at 741.
248
See id at 741.
249
See Hemmingsen, 674 F3d at 819.
250
561 F3d 588, 596 (6th Cir 2009).
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lacks any
definition, the least-sophisticated consumer
knowledge of the concept."2 5 1 This reasoning suggests some
communications could be so beyond the ken of the least
sophisticated consumer so as to render them immaterial. In
contrast, in the context of a default judgment when the collector
is attempting to change the behavior of a judge, "likely an
accomplished attorney before ascending to the bench, and who is
presumed knowledgeable of the law due to his position on the
bench-in other words, a sophisticated individual," 2 5 2 such legal
nuances could have a profound effect on the judge's decision. In
these cases, the proposed standard would expand rather than
contract actionable conduct.
VI. CONCLUSION
In light of the economic downturn and increase in FDCPA
litigation, a court's approach to the FDCPA has taken on an
added salience. For decades, however, courts have grappled with
the FDCPA's text and purposes. As a result, the courts have
answered the question of § 1692e's scope with almost as many
distinct approaches as there are circuit courts. While some
courts have embraced § 1692e's broad language and applied its
protections to a debt collector's communications to a judge,
others have sought to develop bright-line rules or fact-specific
inquires to limit § 1692e's reach. However, the Act's plain
language, purposes, and legislative history all unerringly point
to an approach that applies § 1692e unequivocally to judge
communications. Consequently, any court applying its own
limiting principle runs afoul of the statute's purposes.
That the Act applies to a debt collector's communication
regardless of whether the audience is a judge informs the
inquiry into what is the appropriate standard to assess whether
a communication is false or misleading. Current approaches fail
to either take into account the FDCPA's text or are
inappropriate in light of Congress's objectives. However, a
standard that directs courts to assess FDCPA communications
from the perspective of a reasonable recipient with an eye
towards materiality acknowledges that the recipient of a
communication could be a consumer, an attorney, or, as this
251

Id at 596 (emphasis in original).

252 O'Rourke, 635 F3d at 949.
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Comment explored, a judge. Moreover, the standard addresses
the competing values that animated Congress to pass the Act.
When faced with apparent ambiguity, courts should adopt an
approach that is consistent with both the FDCPA's text and
purposes.

